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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis examines the social credit score (SCS) system of China and the implications 
that it may have in Chinese society. The SCS is a revolutionary accountability system that is 
touted to ascertain a person’s trustworthiness of a person. An individualized score is produced by 
a complex algorithm which takes into account both social and financial behaviors. My research, 
comprised primarily from secondary qualitative data, discusses the SCS system and analyzes the 
political, social, and economic implications that the SCS may have on Chinese society. Conflict 
theory is utilized to help contextualize my findings and explain the increase in authoritative con-
trol I predict will result from the implementation of the SCS system. While the full effect of the 
SCS is yet to be seen, my research indicates that it will play a role in nearly every aspect of the 
social behaviors and financial decisions that the majority of Chinese make on a daily basis. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 The People’s Republic of China is in the process of implementing a revolutionary system 
involving a social credit score. China’s 1.4 billion citizens will be given an initial score that will 
be impacted positively or negatively due to each individual’s actions. These actions, both social 
and financial in behavior, are accounted for and incorporated into a complex algorithm to pro-
duce a unique cumulative score for each person. A citizen’s score will be constantly updated as 
their fiscal actions and social interactions are continually monitored. The People’s Republic of 
China has adopted the SCS system framework from that of several opt-in pilot programs from 
private corporations. The compulsory system currently being implemented will serve the purpose 
of measuring the “trustworthiness” of each citizen. The societal impacts of the SCS are yet to be 
observed in the fullest extent, but an increase in control and accountability is expected to be seen. 
The purpose of this research is to introduce the SCS and evaluate the implications that it may 
have in Chinese society. 
 The SCS system that China is experimenting with raises significant questions. As China 
and many other countries are entering the big data age, it is important to ask how such data will 
be used, and by whom, and for what purpose? Focusing on the SCS system, since China is the 
first country trying to establish a comprehensive national system like this by state, this thesis will 
examine the SCS system in five chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter two has three sec-
tions: the SCS system in comparative and historical perspective, research methodology, and Con-
flict Theory in relation to the SCS system. Chapter three discusses the SCS system, its origin and 
government conveyance. Chapter four is dedicated to the analysis and evaluation of the SCS in 
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five sections: Increase in authority, public perception, political and social implications, economic 
implications and personal experience, followed by a conclusion. 
II. “BIG DATA” AGE: BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW & METHODOLOGY 
PRECEDENTS  
 While the world is entering the big data age, the idea of standardizing the assessment of 
citizens through a social credit score system is not new. What is new is the unprecedented collec-
tion and accumulation of personal data due to technological advances. Several countries around 
the world have implemented programs that closely resemble one part or another of the SCS sys-
tem in China. For example, in Chile, the Directory of Commercial Information (DICOM) is used 
to outline a citizen’s credibility in order to reward or punish them. Certain data extraction meth-
ods have been implemented to develop an individualized DICOM for each Chilean citizen, 
which has an effect on the economic life of the country. People with poor DICOM scores have 
found it difficult to obtain loans, find housing, and get jobs in Chile. There have been many re-
ported economic externalities with the DICOM system that can be expected to be mirrored in 
China. Different from the DICOM system in Chile, the SCS incorporates social behavior into the 
score the system produces. However, it is of note to point out the precedent that Chile has set for 
China (Kormoczi, R).  
 Chile and China are not alone. Other countries, including Russia, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and even the United States have toyed with the idea of implementing programs with 
certain similar characteristics of the Social Credit Score system (Schaer, 2018). In Russia, it is 
reported by Dmitry Kuznetsov, the head of IT at Russia’s Pension Fund that “every achievement 
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in a person’s life – the misses, mistakes, big projects - will be recorded” by 2025 through state-
gathered digital profiles (Times, 2018). The Russian government plans to enable this through a 
$53 billion dollar Digital Economy Program, with one of its main focuses being a “personal de-
velopment trajectory” program. This will enable a student’s academic success and failures to be 
tracked in order to one day be passed on to employers (Times, 2018). The idea of digitizing the 
economy and documenting personal information in a government data base is often met with 
skepticism. Many see the monitoring of daily activities as an opportunity to tighten societal con-
trol.  
 Another example of where this has taken place in the world recently is in Venezuela 
where the Chinese telecom giant, ZTE, has aided Venezuela in developing a ‘social credit sys-
tem’ of their own. This is occurring through the introduction of the “smart card,” or otherwise 
known as the “fatherland card” (Reuters, 2018). The card claims to provide better service to its 
patrons by collecting a range of information on the individual card holder. This information, 
stored in a government database, can include medical history, social media presence, member-
ship of a political party, or even whether an individual has voted or not. The “smart card” has 
emerged as a part of Venezuela’s $96 million dollar government effort in an attempt to bolster 
national security. Skeptics view the “smart card” as an attempt by President Nicolas Maduro to 
stifle political opponents and increase social control. In a bid to get citizens to sign up, Maduro 
has offered a range of incentives in the form of prizes, such as fuel discounts and groceries. Evi-
dently, it has been successful. As of November of 2018, over half of the Venezuelan population, 
nearly 18 million people, have signed up for the “smart card” and handed over their information. 
This development did not happen over night, but rather was instigated as early as 2008 when a 
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Venezuelan delegation was sent to Shenzhen, China. Anthony Daquin, a member of that delega-
tion, was tasked to seek information for an efficient way to provide identification credentials for 
the millions of Venezuelans who lacked basic documentation. The situation in China was similar 
at the time; thus, Venezuela sought to observe their tactics in handling the domestic documenta-
tion issue. Daquin reported that the delegation was amazed by China’s technology and quickly 
realized the wider implications. "What we saw in China changed everything … they were look-
ing to have citizen control” said Anthony Daquin (Reuters, 2018). However, Daquin was unable 
to voice his concerns because he was detained, beaten, and accused of treasonous behavior. He 
was forced to flee Venezuela. The close relationship that China and Venezuela maintain is indica-
tive of the technology they share and the institutions of control they are developing for the man-
agement of their populations (Reuters, 2018).  
 It is clear that China is not the only country, nor the first, that has toyed with some of the  
ideas that constitute the SCS. In an increasingly globalized and digitalized world, the similarities 
between China and other countries are sure to arise, especially through programs such as this. 
From China to Russia to Venezuela, social credit is an emerging accountability tool that these 
and other governments will look to implement in the near future (Kormoczi, R).  
 Historically, China has been dominated by an agrarian society. As recently as 40 years 
ago, China was operating on outdated economic policies that kept the country stagnant, ineffi-
cient, and isolated from the outside world. However, since the economic reform in 1979, China 
has had one of the most rapidly growing economies and GDP’s of any nation in recorded history. 
This is an incredibly impressive feat on the part of China. However, that accomplishment has not 
come without its share of growing pains.  
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 While the Chinese government has been operating under the assumption that economic 
growth is essential for maintaining social stability, the undeveloped infrastructure of their boom-
ing economy has caused some issues on this front. Because of a lack of banking accountability, 
fraud and counterfeiting have become serious domestic economic issues in China. In essence, the 
Chinese economy grew faster than their internal financial banking system. As a historically agro-
economy, relatively few citizens even had banking accounts. There was no efficient or organized 
system to prevent acts of fraud, selling counterfeit goods, and defaulting on loans being account-
ed for or punished. The system starkly under-served the booming economy, resulting in issues 
with trust. A need for accountability and control emerged. Thus, the beginning plans for the So-
cial Credit Score were conceptualized. (Morrison). 
METHODOLOGY  
 My research utilizes a mixed methods approach in order to understand and address the 
Social Credit Score system that is being developed in China and the potential impact that it could 
have. I collected both primary and secondary sources in order to produce qualitative data. The 
majority of the data I collected was from secondary sources that were used to gain an under-
standing of the way in which the nascent Social Credit Score system came to be and operate. 
Some of my primary sources were collected through interviews and conversations with knowl-
edgeable individuals; however, the larger portion of the primary datum was collected from my 
own experience traveling and studying abroad in China during the summer of 2018. Unfortunate-
ly, due to the unpredictable nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, my intent to gather more primary 
data through interviews and meetings was limited. I was curious to interview foreign exchange 
students on campus, as the University of Mississippi has a partnership with the North China Uni-
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versity of Technology (NCUT), the school I attended in China. Because these exchange students 
have the unique experience of living both in China and the United States, I anticipated that their 
perspectives on the SCS system would be enlightening and beneficial to my study. Although I 
could not include it in this research, I am interested in the possibility of incorporating primary 
source interviews of exchanges student’s perception of the SCS in the future. 
 The Foreign Policy Research Institute, the National Bureau of Asia Research, and the 
Congressional Research Institute all aided as secondary sources. Additionally, because of the na-
ture of the subject, many sources were garnered through news articles or websites, including 
pieces by the New York Times, the Atlantic, TIME magazine, CNBC, ABC, and BBC. These ar-
ticles provided specific information about how the Social Credit Score system operates, actions 
that factor into its algorithm, and the financial or social behavior that could impact the SCS. 
These secondary sources, obtained by hours of examining online websites and journals, were 
crucially important to my research. I came across many of these valuable pieces by searching 
keywords relevant to the social credit score, such as “Chinese credit,” “SCS,” and “credit score 
algorithm 2020,” and so on. Once I had collected enough applicable information to work with, I 
began to build a picture of the current state of the Chinese Social Credit Score system. I was then 
able to derive theories of how the SCS may potentially impact the people of China and the social 
repercussions that a system such as this could have.  
 I saved all of the sources that I was able to use and created a running list that grew with 
my research. This list of sources was then converted into a bibliography, organized in APA for-
mat, to accurately account for and credit my work. The mixed methods approach was thus a suc-
cess in creating a holistic picture of the SCS through inductive reasoning. In this way my obser-
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vations and the data I collected led to the body of work produced. I was then able to use these 
premises to supply evidence for and support the conclusion.  
CONFLICT THEORY 
 The theoretical framework that could serve to better contextualize the actions of the Chi-
nese government, through the implementation of the SCS, is the Conflict Theory. Conflict Theo-
ry argues that society is in perpetual conflict as a result of a competition for resources and states 
that societies are not inherently consensual and conflict free. Instead, societies tend to exhibit 
structural power divisions and resource inequalities that lead to conflicting interests (Rössel, J). 
How societal conflict then shapes the society is dependent upon the mobilization of power re-
sources by social actors. Implemented by the Chinese government, the SCS could be viewed as a 
structure to maintain societal stability. Conflict Theory has been implicit in historiography long 
before the notion of a social credit system ever took hold in modern society. Conflict Theory en-
compasses the organization of society, the behavior of people and groups, and the explanation 
behind why various societal structures emerge during specific time periods and in certain loca-
tions (Collins, R).  
 Conflict Theory contextualizes the power inequality between the CCP and the Chinese 
people as the source of the conflict that has led to the development of the SCS system. Power in 
political systems is often a “zero-sum” commodity, meaning that “if one party gains it, somebody 
else must lose. Thus when the less powerful party seeks to increase its power potential, the more 
powerful party will resist these efforts” (Bartos, 2002, pg 31). The development of the Social 
Credit Score system is arguably the way in which the governing entity currently in charge, the 
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CCP, is ensuring its dominance. Conflict Theory enables the SCS to be viewed as an apparatus of 
societal control, utilized by those in power to remain in power. 
 It is due to technological advances that societies are entering the age of big data, which is 
making the establishment of SCS possible. The Chinese government's use of the SCS as a mea-
sure of societal control is creating a precedent for stratification, which is central to Conflict The-
ory and also central to governance under the CCP in China today. With such a massive populous, 
it is easy to understand why the Chinese government takes measures, such as implementing the 
SCS, to influence societal behavior to their benefit. The SCS is a tool to socially engineer behav-
ior, rewarding those who obediently follow the rules and punishing those who do not. Citizens 
benefit from good behavior, and good behavior collectively helps maintain social harmony and 
stability, which in turn helps strengthen the legitimacy of the CCP and CCP leadership .  
 Conflict Theory also aids in viewing the SCS system from a comparative and historical 
perspective. Adaptable to novel circumstances, Conflict Theory helps to contextualize age-old 
human behaviors taking place in rapidly developing circumstances of the present day. For exam-
ple, although the SCS is the most technologically advanced system that has ever been imple-
mented in China, the conflict perspective is still relevant in analyzing the power struggle taking 
place. Conflict Theory typically anticipates the rise of future conflicts in society pertaining to the 
military, economics, organizations, and ideologies (Collins, R). The current circumstances sur-
rounding the SCS system are no exception. For these reasons, Conflict Theory was the theoreti-
cal perspective chosen to help unpack and understand the sociological implications of the Social 
Credit Score system in the most holistic way possible.  
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III. THE SOCIAL CREDIT SCORE  
THE SCS SYSTEM 
 The People’s Republic of China is on track to implement a system for a Social Credit 
Score, or SCS, as a way to evaluate the “trustworthiness” of each of its 1.4 billion individual citi-
zens. This system takes into account innumerable behaviors that can be judged to be either in the 
realm of “good” or “bad” by the standards of China’s government officials. The system works by 
each citizen starting off with an initial allotted social score of 1,000, which is then scaled in a 
letter grading system. For example, a score ranging from 960 to 1,000 is considered to be an A; 
850 to 955 a B; and 840 to 600 a C. Any score that falls below that scale is considered to be a D, 
designating the score-holder as an “untrustworthy” citizen. Social and financial behavior are thus 
accounted for and the cumulation of an individual’s actions result in their personal social credit 
score (Kobie, N).  
 Some infractions are weighted more harshly than others and thus factor differently into 
the complex algorithm that produces one’s social credit score. For example, if a person with an A 
or B score is convicted of drunk driving, their score automatically plummets to a C. With the 
range of scores ranging from an A+ to a D, this offense carries very serious consequences. Fi-
nancial behaviors such as too much “frivolous spending” or bad behaviors, such as speeding, can 
also result in an individual’s social credit score being penalized for actions deemed to be unfa-
vorable by the Chinese government standards. Citizens who engage in inconsiderate behavior in 
public areas are subject to severe repercussions. For example, those who walk their dogs off 
leash can have their pets confiscated by government authorities and are required to take an exam 
in order to get them back. The consequences of a low social credit score can range from de-
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creased access to education and housing loans to travel and transportation restrictions. Because 
the government encourages employers to consult the “blacklist” before hiring, citizens deemed to 
be “untrustworthy” due to a low credit score will effectively become second-class citizens, while 
the elite will have access to desirable social privileges. The benefits of having a high credit score 
for the individual Chinese citizen include perks such as discounts on utility bills or expedited 
government application privileges (Nittle, N).   
 Being “blacklisted” by the government is the result of either having an extremely low so-
cial credit score or having committed an act deemed to be “uncivilized behavior.” There have 
been numerous cases in which Chinese citizens have been found, often to their surprise, to be on 
the “List of Dishonest Persons Subject to Enforcement by the Supreme People's Court” and been 
unable to purchase a plane ticket, or even banned from travel. This precise scenario happened to 
Liu Hu, a journalist in China who often wrote about censorship and government corruption. Ac-
cording to Lu, "there was no file, no police warrant, no official advance notification. They just 
cut me off from the things I was once entitled to.” Furthermore, he divulged "what's really scary 
is there's nothing you can do about it. You can report to no one. You are stuck in the middle of 
nowhere” (Kobie, N). It is possible to be expunged from the blacklist, although it is not directly 
handled through the judicial system alone. An individual must pay their fine or appeal to the 
court in order to resolve the situation (Kobie, N). The blacklist in China has existed long before 
the idea of the SCS system and has typically been associated with individuals who pose a threat 
to the authority if the CCP. The SCS, however, allows for individuals to be relegated to the back-
list due to a low social credit score, which can be influenced by the cumulation of minor or non-
threatening infractions.  
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 If the individual remains on the Blacklist, he or she is subject to be banned from taking 
airplanes or high-speed trains, buying real estate or lavishly decorating a home, going on tours 
and vacations, renting high-end office space, sending a child to private school, or buying premi-
um insurance or wealth-management products. For serious offenders in some cities in China, an 
individual’s personal ringtone is altered by the government in order to shame them into paying 
their debt and removing themselves from the blacklist. The typical phone ringtone is replaced by 
the announcement that, “the person you are calling has been listed as a discredited person by the 
local court. Please urge this person to fulfill his or her legal obligations” (Pak, J).  
 In the eastern Shandong province, the Chinese city of Jinan has recently rolled out a cred-
it scoring system specifically to enforce responsible pet ownership. Since its inception, nearly 
1430 pet owners have been penalized, with up to 120 of these having their pets confiscated alto-
gether. Similar to the driver’s license system of Australia, each registered dog owner will be al-
lotted 12 points when entering the pet demerit system. Points will then be deducted as penalties 
for infractions or socially discouraged behavior. Losing all 12 points means losing one’s pet. The 
amount of points deducted is dependent upon the specific circumstances. For example, if it is an 
owner’s first offense for walking their dog off leash, or neglecting to pick up after their pet, only 
3 points will be deducted. However, for second time offenders of the same violation would be 
fined up to 500 yuan and penalized 6 points for the infraction. For third time offenders, there are 
no more corrective actions. Instead, all points are automatically deducted from their dog registra-
tion and their pets are confiscated.  
 In some cases, if a pet owner is penalized, they will be required to take and pass an exam 
on dog-keeping in order to get their pet back. If a pet-owner fails to keep his or her pet registra-
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tion up-to-date annually, they will have to take and pass an exam on dog-keeping regulations in 
order to maintain ownership of their pet. As a result, it has been reported that complaints about 
pet owners walking their dogs without a leash have dropped by at least 43 percent since the im-
plementation of this pet credit system.  
 While the Social Credit Score system is still in development, it is being actively modeled 
on the results of small scale trial runs. Eight major Chinese companies have launched their own 
state-approved pilot projects that issue “social scores” for their users. One of the highest profile 
examples of these initiatives is Sesame Credit. As a financial wing of Alibaba, the world's big-
gest online shopping platform, Sesame Credit utilizes a data base of over 400 million users in 
order to construct individual social credit scores for each of them.  
 Data is key to the Social Credit Score system’s success. For example with Sesame, one of 
the companies running a pilot project mentioned, it has access to the records of Alipay, Alibaba’s 
mobile-payment app. Alipay is a third-party payment platform which boasts over 1,000,000,000 
members. Because Sesame, has access to the user records, the company can see who has been 
the most brand loyal and reward them accordingly. Essentially, the structure is organized similar-
ly to that of a “frequent-flyer” scheme, offering perks to those who buy into the system the most.  
 These independent pilot programs have now begun to merge and share information on 
their users in order to develop a larger, more encompassing social credit system. For example, 
China’s largest match-making service, Baihe, has partnered with Sesame in order to promote 
their clients with favorable credit scores to potential significant others. Because users are encour-
aged to flaunt their scores on their social media or dating-site platforms, the concept that one’s 
Social Credit Score is a private matter has been significantly diminished since its inception. 
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Sesame has even developed a mobile game in which users will guess if their online friends have 
better or worse credit scores than they do. With the information from Sesame, Baihe has been 
purposefully promoting clients with good credit scores in prominent places on its website (Hat-
ton, C). 
 Sesame has not divulged everything that the company takes into account in order to cre-
ate the “complex algorithm” that calculates an individual’s credit score. It has been explained, 
from the company’s spokeswoman Miranda Shek, that Sesame credit does indeed track the “fi-
nancial and consumption activities of our users,” however, “materials published on social media 
platforms do not affect our users' personal Sesame Credit score” (Campbell, C). 
 The Chinese government is watching these private credit systems carefully, as the Social 
Credit Score system that they intend to fully implement in 2020 will most likely resemble the 
pilot projects in many ways, especially in regard to the algorithms. The SCS will take every citi-
zen into account by merging national databanks of information. However, people occupying cer-
tain professions, such as teachers, doctors, accountants, and journalists, will face particular scru-
tiny from the system. 
 Companies running these pilot projects continue to remind their users that, for now, this 
is a voluntary credit system and that they are freely joining the database by activating profiles.  It 
is important to note though that online shopping for many Chinese is no matter a longer a ques-
tion of convenience, but one of necessity. The private systems are undoubtedly conflated with 
those of the government in an attempt to keep tabs on the society at large (Hatton, C). Thus, Chi-
na’s SCS system is best conceptualized not as a single system, but as an overarching ideology 
and conglomerate of programs. The purpose is to utilize both punishments and rewards in order 
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to promote order and improve governance while simultaneously squelching disorder and fraud 
(Campbell, C). 
THE ORIGIN AND GOVERNMENT CONVEYANCE

 The Social Credit Score system, projected to be fully implemented in 2020, has been in 
various stages of development sine 2015. During this time period the Chinese economy, histori-
cally dominated by all cash transactions between friends and family, was far behind modern 
countries in its credit accountability infrastructure. This lack of reliable credit history for its citi-
zens became glaringly evident as China rose from a position of collectivized economic poverty 
to that of the world’s second largest national economy. The fact that only one in three Chinese 
people had a bank account in 2011 indicates the inevitability of the many issues that arose from 
the economy growing faster than the infrastructure of the credit-systems necessary to regulate it 
(Campbell, C).  Because of this, there were few repercussions for Chinese citizens who defaulted 
on loans, sold counterfeit goods, or orchestrated shoddy business deals. This led to an increasing 
lack of certainty in both individuals and the economic transactions in which they were undertak-
ing. In essence, the trustworthiness of each citizen was impossible to ascertain. This resulted in 
the low-level of trust in the Chinese marketplace (Campbell, C). It was vitally important during 
the rise of China’s economy to correct this issue of trust. This need for structure presented a win-
dow of opportunity for the Chinese government to introduce the SCS system under the pretext 
that it would increase stability and accountability in society.  
 As President Xi Jinping seeks to fulfill the “China Dream” by increasing China’s in-
ternational sphere of influence, it is imperative that he is comfortable with the level of control he 
holds domestically. The Social Credit Score system will ascertain a certain level of predictability 
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that the Chinese government can reasonably expect from its citizens (Rolland, Nadège). One as-
pect of this pertains to ideological control, which has “markedly increased in recent years” in 
China (Rolland, 2020, pg 26). According to the NBR Special Report #83, China is “incremental-
ly moving from an outsider and a reformer of the existing rules to becoming a leader that takes 
the initiative, controls the agenda, and sets its own rules and norms” (Rolland, 2020, pg 45). The 
implementation of the SCS exemplifies the ways in which China is experimenting with new 
forms of societal control and establishing the acceptance of new norms.  
 A system such as the SCS does not does not launch into full effect over night. The Chi-
nese government must have a way to convey to its citizens that the SCS is active, their scores are 
live, and their actions are up for evaluation. It has been reported that public transport has had 
some role in imparting to Chinese citizens that their actions can directly affect their social credit 
score. Overhead announcements on the bullet train for example, convey to passengers that disor-
derly conduct will result in a personal score docking .  
 The actual text of the Chinese law regarding the SCS is somewhat difficult to ascertain, 
but the interviews from Chinese citizens indicate a common knowledge of the SCS and of its on-
going incorporation into the daily life of the average person. Generating awareness of such ubiq-
uitous monitoring does not appear to be an issue within the major cities of China. Through the 
tactic of naming and shaming individuals, the Chinese government has been able to convey to its 
citizens, in no uncertain terms, the consequences of making the blacklist due to a low social cred-
it score. A movie theater in the city of Lishui, Zhejiang province reportedly displayed the images 
of blacklisted individuals during the preview portion of a film. The names and faces of more than 
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300 people have been displayed at the theater and on public LED screens throughout the city as 
well (Koetse, M).  
 In May of 2019, government regulations on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of 
the Elderly were explicitly outlined in a Chinese article regarding the new Shanghai Municipal 
Regulations. It conveyed that individuals refusing to visit their elderly family members, the el-
derly could file a lawsuit to ask them to fulfill their obligations. “The court in Shanghai can also 
make relevant judgments based on the prosecution of the elderly, requiring the children to go 
home or visit the nursing home. If the parties refuse to execute this effective judgment, the rele-
vant information will be included in the credit platform, which will have a certain impact on the 
parties' work and life” (Shanghai New Regulations). This message was also distributed on the 
Chinese Central Television channel for the greater Shanghai province to view (CCTV Net). In 
this way, the retirement agency provides a widely distributed incentive to urge family members 
to visit their elderly relatives, lest they face SCS repercussions.  
V. ANALYSIS & EVALUATION 
	 The SCS is an apparatus of control that generates socially engineered behavior through 
rewards and punishments. The new “normal” could be a state of significantly more repercussions 
to actions displeasing to the CCP and result in the tightening of control for personal freedoms 
and autonomy and an increased sense of stability for the Chinese government and the Party.

INCREASED AUTHORITY   
 The presidential two-term limit in the Chinese Constitution was changed in 2018 to allow 
Xi Jinping to continue at the helm of the Party and Chinese government and solidify the power 
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he has held since rising to the top of the Communist party in 2012. By working his way up 
through the ranks of officialdom, President Xi has cultivated alliances and positioned himself to 
be in power for years to come (Ramzy, A). As President Xi Jinping’s power continues to grow, 
the carrot and stick model utilized by the SCS is concurrently positioned to increase the power 
that the government has in dictating the lives and actions of Chinese citizens. As President Xi 
Jinping seeks to fulfill the “China Dream” by increasing China’s international sphere of influ-
ence, it is imperative that he solidify the level of control he holds domestically. The Social Credit 
Score system will ascertain a certain level of predictability and control that the Chinese govern-
ment can reasonably expect from its citizens (Rolland, Nadège).   
 The SCS mirrors anti-corruption campaign put forth by President Xi. According to Dr. 
Rogier Creemers, a researcher in the law and governance of China at Leiden University, “Presi-
dent Xi’s anti-corruption campaign was designed to regain the population’s trust into local gov-
ernment,” which happens to be the purported goal of the SCS as well (Creemer, R). 
 President Xi began his anti-corruption campaign in 2012 and the courts have since found 
over 1.5 million Chinese government officials guilty of some corruption related charge. By 
cleaning house and wiping out political foes, President Xi has been able to consolidate power 
very quickly. His anti-corruption campaign has been one of the most defining aspects of his pres-
idency. It has been suggested that for President Xi, persecuting anti-corruption initiative was an 
all too convenient cover for both the rise in his power and its solidification. It was in March of 
2018 that three specific votes in China’s 13th National People’s Congress, which hosts nearly 
3000 delegates, were cast in favor of expanding President Xi’s influence to unprecedented levels 
in the People’s Republic of China. Not only was President Xi re-elected for a second term in of-
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fice, but the presidential term limits were also done away with. Thus, President Xi’s reign has the 
potential to continue for the entirety of his professional lifetime. The second major change to the 
constitution took place in the form of implementing the National Supervisory Commission, a 
new regulatory agency intended to centralized control over anti-corruption campaign resources. 
A trusted aid of President Xi, Yang Xiaodu, was appointed as the head of the agency. Because of 
their close relationship, it is suspected that President Xi’s influence over the National Superviso-
ry Commission will be all but absolute. As the new anti-corruption authority, the National Super-
visory Commission is unconstrained by the Chinese law or government. Furthermore, the Na-
tional Supervisory Commission has a higher status than China’s Supreme Court and is only ac-
countable to top party leaders, thus providing President Xi with even more power and influence 
through institutions of control (Fiol-Mahon, A). Because of this, SCS system is now positioned 
to be a tool at President Xi’s disposal.  
 Through the publicity of the consequences of a low social credit score, generated by 
complex algorithms, the SCS has already had a significant impact on the people of China. Many 
agencies of authority know this and utilize the system to control the behavior of the population at 
large. It was reported by freelance journalist, James O’Malley, that overhead announcements on 
a bullet train headed from Beijing to Shanghai warned passengers to not misbehave or else their 
“behavior will be recorded in individual credit information system” (Ma, 2018). The announce-
ment went on to say that in order to “avoid a negative record of personal credit” passengers were 
expected to “follow the relevant regulations” (Ma, 2018). The regulation violations were then 
listed as such behaviors as traveling without a ticket, smoking in public places, or other disorder-
ly behavior, a subjective standard defined exclusively by the CCP. In conclusion, the announce-
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ment urged the passengers once again to follow the rules of regulation and even to “help with the 
orders on the train and at the station” (Ma, 2018). James O’Malley recorded this situation and 
posted it to his twitter platform on October 29, 2018. Since this time, over a year ago, the Chi-
nese have been consistently moving closer to the final implementation of a national Social Credit 
Score system which will enforce regulations and place value on individuals depending on their 
social credit score (Ma, 2018).  
PUBLIC PERCEPTION 
 While many might make the argument that this type of enforcement limits individual 
freedom and autonomy, it is not to be criticized for its lack of effectiveness. Some citizens go as 
far to say that the system is making them better people already. A 32-year-old entrepreneur re-
portedly confided to a dispatch that he felt “like in the past six months, people’s behavior has 
gotten better and better.” The man, who only went by the name of Chen, added “when we drive, 
now we always stop in front of crosswalks. If you don’t stop, you will lose your points. At first, 
we just worried about losing points, but now we got used to it” (Ma, 2018). 
 It seems fitting that the man who reported this information was from the town of 
Rongcheng, China. Rongcheng is a modern and quickly developing city at the eastern extremity 
of Shandong Province. As indicated by its suburban communities and broad streets, it has been 
said that Rongcheng was built with an eye for future expansion. After all the SCS has arisen out 
of China’s economic expansion into the global market and the adaptations that such advance-
ments required (Mistreanu, S). 
 With all the concern and skepticism in the air regarding the Social Credit Score system, it 
is important to consider public perception of the positive impact that the system could have on 
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the people and the People’s Republic of China. Western countries tend to view the SCS in a neg-
ative light as a form of social control. However, it has also been argued that the SCS is a compli-
cated system intended to focus primarily on financial and commercial behaviors, rather than po-
litical ones (Kobie, N). Chinese citizens have been reported to have a positive opinion on the 
emerging system. According to a 2018 study conducted at the University of Berlin by Genia 
Kostka, there is a surprisingly high degree of public approval of the SCS. The educated and el-
derly populations are reported to hold a more positive opinion of the SCS system. While it would 
be reasonable to assume that this demographic would be more concerned over privacy implica-
tions, that was not the case. These citizens are actively interpreting the SCS through the lens of a 
benefit-generating system that ensures honest dealings in society, rather than one of privacy-vio-
lation. The way in which an individual views the SCS is largely dependent upon the socio-demo-
graphic factors from which they are classified. It was found that people between the ages of 30 
and 50 were the most skeptical of enterprises involved in economic activities collecting data. 
Approval of the SCS tends to be higher in urban areas than rural ones. The study concluded by 
acknowledging that although the SCS is designed as state surveillance infrastructure, that pur-
pose is not what initially comes to mind for Chinese citizens. It is conceivable that public opin-
ion could shift as the SCS solidifies its influence on society, but for the moment it is well re-
ceived by the citizens of the People’s Republic of China (Kostka, G).   
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 Research has concluded that algorithms, such as the one used to generate scores in the 
Chinese SCS system, have the potential to disproportionately bring down minorities’ credit 
scores. People who tend to live in low-income areas are at significantly higher risk of having a 
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credit score that is detrimental to their economic outcomes. In the U.S. for example, factors such 
as race, gender, ethnicity, and social-class were once taken into account in order to generate an 
individual’s credit score. Since then, this discriminatory practice has been outlawed by the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act. Nevertheless, it serves as an example that using an individual’s personal 
information in an algorithm could produce similar discriminatory results. With Conflict Theory 
in mind, it is important to be aware of how class divides can be perpetuated and replicated with a 
credit system (Waddell, K).  
 In fact, this is exactly what is happening with the SCS in regions of China with large mi-
nority Muslim groups. Chinese tech start-ups have built algorithms that the government is using 
to track Uighurs, particularly in the Xinjiang region. Vast surveillance networks are used to mon-
itor many of the 11 million Uighurs who reside in China. Government entities, such as local po-
lice departments, are reportedly using facial recognition technology to scan faces and determine 
whether residents are Uighurs. In 2019, within the course of a single month, a system screened 
citizens over 500,000 times to keep tabs on the population of the minority Muslim group. The 
local law enforcement in the central province of Shaanxi aimed to acquire a smart camera system 
that “should support facial recognition to identify Uighur/non-Uighur attributes” (Mozur, 2019). 
Uighurs more often resemble people with facial features predominantly associated with Central 
Asia, distinguishing them from China’s majority Han population. Such differences make it pos-
sible for facial recognition and A.I. software to accurately single them out. Clare Garvie, an as-
sociate at the Center on Privacy and Technology at Georgetown Law explains that “if you make a 
technology that can classify people by an ethnicity, someone will use it to repress that 
ethnicity” (Mozur, 2019). The A.I. companies that are responsible for creating this software in-
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clude Yitu, Megvii, SenseTime, and CloudWalk, each worth an estimated one billion US dollars. 
Megvii reported that the company was focused on commercial, not political solutions. Regard-
less of their intentions, the software that these companies are producing is what makes the im-
plementation of the SCS system possible. In a statement Megvii claims that it is “concerned 
about the well-being and safety of individual citizens, not about monitoring groups” (Mozur, 
2019). Still, the externalities of monitoring software is dependent upon the way that it is used. 
The SCS is the first nationalized system that uses such advanced technology and the implications 
are sure to be felt in Chinese society. 
 According to Jing Zeng, a researcher at the University of Zurich, the Chinese Justice sys-
tem uses toothless policy in lieu of genuine protection for its citizens. In essence, Zeng argues 
that there is an ever-present potential for abuse of power, stemming from the Chinese govern-
ment’s interpretation of laws. A program or policy, for example, can appear to be apolitical at the 
surface level, however, as soon as the CCP deems them to be political, they can be used for polit-
ical purposes (Kobie, N). Viewed through the lens of Conflict Theory, the SCS has the potential 
to disenfranchise individual citizens and solidify the power of the government and its officials.  
 Another danger with the SCS that Zeng identified had to do with the idea of a “negative 
spiral.” This concept looks at the social negative externalities that the SCS could create by exas-
perating class divides, or depending on their score, creating different classes of people. The ma-
jor concern from the “negative spiral” is that once an individual falls into a category with a low 
social credit score, it could be very difficult to regain points. One of the punishments for a low 
score is to slow down government paperwork and the bureaucratic process for afflicted individu-
als. Thus, the system would continue to work to the disadvantage of those most marginalized by 
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it, squandering many people’s potential for upward mobilization into higher SCS categories (Ko-
bie, N).  
 Through the implementation of the Social Credit Score system, the Chinese are outward-
ly expressing their disdain for corruption and fraud. However, skeptics have been quick to point 
out the all too convenient and virtuous guise that the SCS portrays, while simultaneously strip-
ping its citizens of autonomy and freedom. While cracking down on internal corruption, through 
the restriction of freedoms, one might wonder if China is as dedicated to the cause in relation to 
their external and foreign affairs. Based on their reputation for intellectual property theft, the an-
swer is abundantly clear. It is not difficult for the case to be made that China has more on the 
agenda than simply ascertaining the trustworthiness of its citizens. I would argue, based on the 
evidence and projected repercussions of the SCS, that the Chinese government is more interested 
in having an air-tight grip on its citizens by socially engineering behavior and squelching disso-
nance.   
 These are the issues that raise the most concern. The silencing of speech, arrest of politi-
cal dissidents, and the stripping of basic human freedoms based on a credit system are all serious 
issues that infringe on human rights. This is the reality of the situation currently at hand. It is not 
the crack down on drunk driving, it is the repercussions of the system and the punishments which 
carry enough weight to take any sort of restorative justice off the table for that individual. As 
previously stated, if a person with a score above a C is convicted with drunk driving, his or her 
score would automatically plummet to a C. Of course, drunk driving itself is very serious offense 
and every precaution should be taken to dissuade citizens in any country from making such a 
dangerous decision. However, the individual in China may not be able to recover from that deci-
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sion with a C as their Social Credit Score. A low score will make other aspects of one’s life hard-
er. Their bills will not be discounted, their government documents will be processed slower, they 
might not even be able to buy a train ticket to get to and from work. It could quickly become a 
downward spiral of defeat. In a country that already struggles with the social mobility of its citi-
zens and a long standing history of classism, the SCS is positioned to only exacerbate these is-
sues (Mistreanu, S).  
 Social issues have often arisen as a result or a symptom of Credit systems. While China is  
in a particularly tough spot because they have incorporated social behaviors into their SCS, they 
are not the only country to deal with these issues. In America, minority and marginalized groups 
avoid seeking credit due to a history of discrimination. African Americans are less likely to seek 
credit due to decades of discrimination. However, the aversion to these institutions distances 
people of color from the very outlets they need to be able to thrive in the United States. Good 
credit is essential, as it can impact everything from mortgage rates to an employer’s hiring deci-
sions. Thus, the ramifications of avoiding credit institutions based on past perceived trauma can 
have very negative impacts on the trajectory of one’s financial success. The results of an investi-
gation produced by the National Fair Housing Alliance indicated that 60% of the time when an 
applicant, who was a person of color, was offered a car loan, it was higher-priced than those of-
fered to their white counterparts. This alarming statistic still stands even when the person of col-
or was more financially qualified (Yearwood, 2019).  
 This has been such a prevalent issue in America that legislation to combat it has been in-
troduced as recently as May of 2019. The Loan Shark Prevention Act is designed to “combat the 
predatory lending practices of America’s big banks and protect consumers already burdened with 
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exorbitant credit-card interest rates” (Yearwood, 2019). This will likely benefit consumers of 
color, as the legislation would cap interest rates at 15%.  
 People who have been oppressed by a system are now seeking to avoid it entirely. Unfor-
tunately, this defensive behavior will only serve to be detrimental in the long-term. There is a 
longstanding debate as to if credit score algorithms are racially biased. It is impossible to make 
the argument, however, that one’s credit score is entirely racially based. The vice president of 
scores and analytics at credit-scoring company FICO, Joanne Gaskin, says that the firm does not 
factor in “age, address, employment, income, gender or race” in the algorithm that generates 
scores (Yearwood, 2019). Ricki Lowitz, the chief executive officer at a Chicago-based nonprofit 
called Working Credit, has made it his mission to assist disenfranchised customers. He believes 
the best way to do this is to first help them overcome “their deep seated fear of credit.” Lowitz 
confided that many of her clients, 80% of which are people of color, are often angry that they did 
not have all of the information on how a credit system operates. “We meet people who have been 
beaten down by the system,” Lowitz said. “In some cases, we are contradicting their parents and 
grandparents who have told them to stay away” (Yearwood, 2019). Educating the public is per-
haps the most important resource we have in the fight for equity. Credit Scores, in America have 
the potential to do as much good as harm. The disparity in education has caused more damage 
than the system itself. “The fact that race is not factored into the credit score is perhaps the great-
est opportunity we have to help people of color level the playing field,” Lowitz said (Yearwood, 
2019).  
 While the credit system of America and the social credit score system of China do not 
mirror each other exactly, there are enough similarities between the two to draw comparisons. If 
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the credit system of the United States has been known to cause some issues involving the widen-
ing disparity between social and economic classes, the same occurrence could take place in Chi-
na, especially considering the SCS incorporates social behaviors in addition to financial ones. 
Credit systems are not inherently discriminatory, but historically speaking they have the potential 
to cause much harm. They are, however, very necessary in today’s modern age and market. Chi-
na needs a financial credit system. As the world’s second largest economy, and projected to soon 
be the first, it was imperative for the Chinese government to develop an accountability system to 
assure trustworthiness. It is not a question of why, but in what way the credit system will be im-
plemented.  
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 
 The Social Credit Score system aims to build a real-time database to monitor not only 
individual, but corporate and government behavior as well (Koty, A. C). Thus, in addition to af-
fecting the rights of individual citizens, the SCS is projected to significantly effect business in 
China. Although Beijing insists that the SCS is intended to develop a “fair, transparent, and pre-
dictable” business environment, skepticism has arisen that the motives are more complex. As the 
central government continues to consolidate power, data companies will likely be obligated to 
share more and more of their intellectual property. In light of the escalating tensions with the 
United States, concerns have arisen in the way the Chinese government might potentially use the 
data. It is projected that the SCS, which enables the Chinese government to reward individual 
behavior it approves of and punish what it does not, will bleed into the realm of business. The 
continually evolving databases of information will allow the government to monitor and track all 
business under the domain of the People’s Republic of China. This will effectively and efficient-
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ly streamline the institutions of control China seeks to impose upon the business sector. Such a 
concept is projected to more stringently enforce the way companies comply with the law, as well 
as raise the penalties for those implicated with partners involved with corrupt activity. Thus, the 
corporate world will be just as affected by the SCS as the individual. According to the EU 
Chamber and Sinolytics report, “higher scores can mean lower tax rates, better credit conditions, 
easier market access and more public procurement opportunities for companies. Lower scores 
lead to the opposite, and can even result in blacklisting” (Cheng, E). This system will be so 
scrupulous with detail that in some circumstances companies can be held liable for the actions of 
individual employees. Succinctly, an employee’s personal SCS can affect the SCS of the business 
for which they work (Cheng, E).  
 In addition to concerns over how the SCS will affect Chinese businesses domestically, 
there is also reason to believe that the system could be used as a tool in the global trade war. In 
light of the escalating trade dispute between the United States and China, a system that has the 
potential to limit market access to foreign companies, such as the SCS has cause to be watched 
closely in the coming quarters. The implications could mean companies would be required to 
provide enormous amounts of data. Sinolytics CEO Bjorn Conrad commented that “it opens the 
opportunity to use the system in a fairly targeted way in the midst of a trade conflict” (Cheng, E). 
The emergence of a Social Credit Score system gives the Chinese government more insight 
through the databases of information available. This is made possible by requiring companies 
who do business in China to internally collect data and submit it to the government. The conse-
quences of not abiding by these rules can now have a significantly negative impact on businesses 
because of the Social Credit Score system. Fear of the ramifications for violations will bend 
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businesses to the wishes and interests of the Chinese government. This reaches far beyond the 
traditional parameters used to evaluate a company’s “trustworthiness” for the business’s ratings 
(Cheng, E).  
 When I personally interviewed him, Gary Giles, as the prior Vice President of Far East 
Operation of the Juice Plus Company, weighed in on the issue in relation to the business he con-
ducted in China over the past decade. At one point in his career, Giles would visit China every 30 
days. The frequency of his travels was eventually dialed back to at least three times a year. Giles 
primarily worked in Beijing, but also had business in Shanghai and Xian. A decade ago Giles had 
a business venture involved with a fruit and vegetable juice powder product. This product was to 
be made in US with some stages of production taking place in China. Giles also worked with one 
of the largest mothers and children care nutrition and wellness company, Baoying, which trans-
lates to BabyCare.  
 When asked if he perceived that Chinese citizens were wary of repercussions for their 
actions that might be viewed negatively, Gary replied “do you mean are they afraid of their na-
tional government? I didn’t see it but I don’t know if they know any better.” He then added, “The 
key to the Chinese is that they want to be respected. They work a six day week, they work hard 
and all they want is respect and also what we have, which is an incredible lifestyle.” I prodded 
more deeply and asked Giles if he had experienced any surveillance during his business meetings 
that would possibly affect the course of conversation between him and the Chinese businessmen 
with which he was negotiating. Giles responded, “Surveillance? No. But I believe they have a 
proclivity towards theft of intellectual property. They put themselves in a position to know things 
about people.” Giles did not hear anything in business dealings about a social credit score system 
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and did not perceive it to be a decision making factor for the Chinese business men in the deals 
he was conducting.  
 This notion is right in line with that of the allowances associated with economic reform 
and growth since the Mao Era. One of Deng Xiaoping’s famous sayings fleshes out this idea. It 
goes as such, “it doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice” (Buck-
le, M). In essence, the growth of the economy has been placed at the forefront of China’s agenda 
and, as long as insubordination to the CCP does not occur, allowances for many different forms 
of economic growth are made. This includes Gary Giles’s business ventures. For example, when 
I asked about the Firewall, he answered, “it is interesting, the wall is actually not nearly as strong 
in the Western Hotels I could access CNN in the FourSeasons which I could not if I walked out 
on the streets.” When asked why, Giles added “The firewall is weakened to appease the traveling 
business executives, the firewall outside in the city is to control behavior.” This led Giles to 
lament that, from his experience, “a big issue in China is counterfeiting, my product has many 
anti-counterfeiting measures attached to the product so that it can be trusted to be authentic.” He 
adds the lack of accountability has led to “pure economic incentive, the possibility of profit is too 
much to say no too.” Giles then remarked that, “this could be one of the very reasons that the 
Chinese government is implementing such a system as the SCS. This attempt to shut down on 
counterfeiting and fraud is indicative that they have a real problem with this.” To wrap up the 
interview, I concluded with the question that deeply intrigued me. I asked him, “In addition to its 
benefits, could the SCS be an all too convenient cover-up to control behavior while looking like 
the good guys?” Gary Giles looked up, “Yes.” 
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PERSONAL EXPERIENCE  
 So how can a Social Credit Score system truly operate? Facial technology has allowed for 
the tracking and constant surveillance of individuals in areas where it is active. When I was in 
Beijing in the summer of 2018, I noticed security cameras on almost every corner. In the shop-
ping malls and markets, they were prevalent as well. One example of facial recognition technol-
ogy that I personally experienced first-hand was in the public bathrooms inside the shopping 
malls that we visited. The example that I most vividly recall took place in the Pearl Market. 
Upon entering the restroom, each individual was prompted to interact with a kiosk implanted in 
the wall. This kiosk had a camera that captured one’s image, typically shoulders up, and project-
ed it onto the screen. I found myself looking at a computer generated, real-time image of myself. 
This image was then quickly, yet scrupulously, recorded by the device. Markers of the distinct 
qualities of my face where identified, such as my brows, eyes, nose, and jaw. Once being facially 
scanned and recorded, I was dispensed a few sheets of toilet paper. For the sake of experimenta-
tion, I came back a short time later. The kiosk went through the same process, yet this time it 
identified me as a recent user. A message was projected upon the screen in Chinese characters, 
but a small English translation was below. It read something along the lines of “user disabled for 
30 minutes” with a count-down clock indicating how much more time that I must wait before I 
was eligible to receive any more toilet paper from the machine in the public restroom. I took a 
step back and watched as my image in the screen did the same until I no longer appeared before 
it. Fascinated and slightly unnerved, I decided to hang back and observe. A Chinese woman ap-
proached the kiosk next, in a similar fashion the machine scanned her image, facially-recognized 
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her, and dispensed the allotted amount of toilet paper. This appeared to be normal to her as there 
was no hesitation or look of uncertainty in her demeanor.  
 This was perhaps the most fascinating aspect of the entire experience to me. It was not 
the fact that this technology existed, it was the way in which it was so widely accepted. For many 
citizens in the People’s Republic of China, being monitored, surveyed, and recorded is not neces-
sarily a cause for concern. While we are equipped with the same advanced technology, the per-
ception of how it may be appropriately employed is very different in the United States (Sturmer, 
J). In China, facial recognition systems are able to track an individual across an entire city. In 
2017, Chinese officials presented their technology while working with BBC News. In under sev-
en minutes, a journalist who was sent out into the city was located among the throngs of pedes-
trians. This was possible through facial recognition technology paired with the country's network 
of 170 million CCTV cameras (Kobie, N).  
 When in China, I was very interested in the degree to which social  and economic mobili-
ty were achievable for the average Chinese citizen. Because a system, such as the Social Credit 
Score system is inherently harsher to citizens of lower socio-economic classes, it has been my 
intent to research its effects. A concern is that the SCS will more greatly benefit those in a privi-
leged position, while simultaneously adding hurdles to those already struggling financially or 
socially. Thus, there is reason to believe that the SCS will limit social and economic mobility for 
Chinese citizens. Credit systems in general have proven this to be true. We can find examples in 
the United States of the credit system unfairly treating specific groups of people. However, the 
one that China is implementing is even more alarming than the ones that we have previously 
been exposed to because of the fact that it not only takes into account financial behaviors, but 
  McWilliams 37
social behaviors as well. By analyzing people’s social connections, new ways to discriminate 
against them  have arisen. Algorithms can bring down credit scores quickly, particularly those of 
marginalized or minority groups. Behaviors that are not necessarily illegal, yet still discouraged 
by the government, are positioned to seriously limit an individual’s autonomy. However, prevent-
ing this type of discrimination is not the purported goal of the Social Credit Score system. The 
goal is to ascertain the trustworthiness of each citizen by socially engineering behavior with a 
system of punishments and rewards. It happens to be the case that the privileged are in a better 
position to benefit from the SCS and the marginalized are more likely to be unable to do so to the 
same degree (Waddell, K).  
V. CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, the Social Credit Score system of China is a rapidly developing, digital 
concept that seeks to ascertain the trustworthiness of individual citizens. While parts of the SCS 
are not novel, the comprehensive whole of the system is something the world has not yet seen. 
From complex algorithms to facial recognition technology, the SCS is a tool that has emerged 
from the advanced placement of our society. In the “big data” age, it is unclear to what extent the 
limits of the externalities from the SCS may be. As the system continues to be fully implemented 
across China, it will be interesting to watch the development of the controls pertaining to both 
social and economic behavior. Many other countries around the world have similar access to 
their citizens’ private information. Facial recognition technology, targeted adds, financial records, 
and personalized algorithms are available globally. It is the manner in which this “big data” is 
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being used in China that specifically distinguishes China from other countries that have access to 
personal data.   
 The Chinese government’s role of data recording has had a positive impact in controlling 
the spread of COVID-19. Based on personal data, such as recorded travel, hotel stays or WeChat 
pay, the Chinese government has been able to identify individuals who have been exposed to the 
virus, follow the trail of those individuals, and enforce quarantine of those in contact or impact-
ed. These measures so far have helped to effectively control the spread of COVID-19 within 
China and illustrated the way in which society, as a whole, could benefit from a social credit 
score system in a pandemic crisis. 
 The implementation of the SCS is an apparatus of societal control that can be contextual-
ized through the conflict perspective. While Conflict Theory helps us view China’s actions as a 
measure to ensure the stability of its government, it also conveys that the SCS is a tool used by 
those in power to squelch social and political dissidents. The externalities that could result from 
the implementation of the Social Credit Score system should be considered seriously. Even in its 
infancy, the SCS is capable of major societal effects. I would anticipate a stricter enforcement 
against actions that criticize the CCP. I believe the Chinese government will be able to wield 
even greater control over its citizens as the SCS becomes a normal and accepted part of life in 
China. Some Chinese citizens will benefit from the SCS, and some will certainly face the penal-
ties that come with a low score. Regardless, I anticipate that the SCS will play a role in nearly 
every aspect of the social behaviors and financial decisions that the majority of Chinese make on 
a daily basis.  
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